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The chapter is devoted to the discussion of the telecommunications development 
strategy. Communication specialists all around the world are facing the problem: how 
to shift from circuit switching to packet switching. The same problem is the main 
challenge for the US Department of Defense. We discuss the Defense Information 
System Network move from circuits to packets, namely, “Joint Vision 2010” doctrine - 
the implementation of signaling protocol #7 and Advanced Intelligent Network, 
and “Joint Vision 2020” - the network transformation by the transition to Assured 
Services Session Initiation Protocol and Multifunctional SoftSwiches. We describe 
some packet switching shortcomings during the implementation of Joint Vision 2020, 
namely, the failed GSM-O contract and Joint regional security stacks failures. The 
Defense Department’s newly released cloud strategy positions the general-purpose 
Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) cloud initiative as the foundation. The 
strategy emphasizes a cloud hierarchy at DoD, but JEDI cloud strategy leaves a series 
of unanswered questions relating to the interoperability of clouds. The JEDI cloud 
strategy has based on Artificial Intelligence Initiative. We conclude that the long-term 
channel - packet coexistence seems inevitable, especially in the face of growing cyber 
threats.
Keywords: circuit switching, packet switching, joint vision 2010, advanced 
intelligent network, joint vision 2020, SS7, IP, AS-SIP, softswitch, defense information 
systems network, defense red switched network, artificial intelligence
1. Introduction
The chapter is devoted to the discussion of the telecommunications development 
strategy. Communication specialists all around the world are facing the problem: 
how to shift from circuit switching to packet switching. The same problem is the 
main challenge for the U.S. Department of Defense.
“The DoD today still has analog, fixed, premises-based, time-division multiplexing 
(TDM) and even asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) infrastructure,”- is the AT&T 
view [1]. Really, the DoD has one aging network based on circuit switching point-
to-point circuits. This “old” technology requires an expensive support of hardware 
and additional upgrades with difficulties carried on in the IP era.
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Cyber threats are another hard obstacle in a move to IP world. In October of 
2018, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) has reported [2], the United States 
weapons systems developed between 2012 and 2017 have severe, even “mission 
critical” cyber vulnerabilities. DoD weapon systems nowadays are more and more 
software dependent (Figure 1). We observe the weapons, from ships to aircrafts; 
use more software than even before. For example, the aircraft F-35 Lighting II 
software contains eight million lines of code [3].
The rest of paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are about DoD’s strategies “Joint 
Vision 2010” and “Joint Vision 2020,” respectively. In Sections 4 and 5, we consider 
the target DISN infrastructure and Joint regional security stacks. In Section 6, the 
up-to-date JEDI Cloud Strategy and Artificial Intelligence Initiative have given 
in short. In the concluding Section 7, we point out rather unsuccessful US Army 
Regulator fights for IP technology. It is exampled by Defense Red Switch Network 
using 40 years old ISDN technology.
2. Joint vision 2010
The Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) is a global network. It 
provides the transfer of various types of information (speech, data, video, multime-
dia). Its purpose is to provide the effective and secure control of troops, communi-
cations, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.
The new DoD Doctrine [4] had issued by General J. Shalikashvili in 1995. This is 
the keystone document for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer 
(C4) systems up to now. At that time, “Joint Vision 2010” doctrine met a strong 
criticism from the US GAO side [5]. The GAO pointed out that the military services 
are operating as many as 87 independent networks. DISA initiated a similar data call 
after GAO survey and identified much more - 153 networks throughout Defense.
General J. Shalikashvili had met the technological uncertainty and the contro-
versial requirements. Under these conditions, DISA (Defense Information Systems 
Agency) has made a very important decision - to use the “open architecture” and 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products only for military communication net-
works. The decision was – to use widely tested developments of Bell Labs, namely, 
the telephone signaling protocol SS7 and the Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN). 
Figure 1. 
Software and information technology systems in aircraft (shown for classification reasons) [2].
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These products were rather ‘old’ at that time: SS7 protocols had developed at Bell 
Labs since 1975 and defined as ITU standards in 1981.
The details regarding the transition to SS7 and AIN we found in a paper [6] from 
Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space – the well-known Defense contractor.
SS7 is an architecture for performing out-of-band signaling. In supports the 
call establishment, routing, and information exchange functions as well as enables 
network performance. In own order, the Advanced Intelligent Network was origi-
nally designed as a critical tool to offer sophisticated services such as “800” calls 
and directory assistance. The functional structure of the SS7 makes it possible to 
create the AIN by putting together functional parts: Service Control Point, Service 
Switching Point, the Service Creation Environment, Service Management System, 
Intelligent Peripheral, Adjunct, and the Network Access Point. Figure 2 describes 
the AIN components that operate in the worldwide military telecommunication 
network, as well as how they are deployed in SS7 backbone, the space Wide Area 
Figure 2. 
Advanced intelligent network military service architecture [6].
Figure 3. 
The simplified DISN view: The current state [7].
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Network (WAN), circuit switched voice network and the packet switched terres-
trial WAN.
To illustrate the current DISN architecture (Figure 3) we refer to the certifica-
tion of Avaya PBX by DISA Joint Interoperability Test Command in 2012 [7]. The 
SS7 network is some kind of the nervous system of DISN up to the resent time. 
It connects the channel mode MFS (MultiFunctional Switches) and many others 
network components. That is, within the DISN network, the connections have 
established by means of SS7 signaling. All new terminal equipment what appears is 
largely IP type, nevertheless SS7 network retains its central place.
3. Joint vision 2020: all-over-IP
Just a few years later as “Joint Vision 2010” had introduced, namely, in 2007 the 
next Pentagon strategy “Joint Vision 2020” appeared. Pentagon published a funda-
mental program [8]. There we find the most important point: DISN have been built 
on basis of IP protocol (Figure 4). IP protocol should be the only means of commu-
nication between the network’s transport layer and all available applications. The 
following 10 years have shown it is an extremely hard challenge.
To implement Joint Vision 2020, the most important step is the replacing of 
channel switching electronic Multifunctional switches (MFS) by packet switch-
ing routers. The transition to IP protocol has based on the use of Multifunctional 
SoftSwiches (MFSS) and new signaling protocol AS-SIP (Assured Services Session 
Initiation Protocol). MFSS operates as a media gateway (MG) between TDM 
circuits switching and IP packet switching components. During the transition 
phase, MFSS operates under the control of the media gateway controller (MGC). 
Communications control protocol H.248 has used between MG and MGC. As 
shown in Figure 5, MFSS should be pure packet switch besides DRSN ‘island’ using 
ISDN protocol.
A few words about SIP signaling. The SIP protocol widely used now for internet 
telephony is not able to provide secrecy during transmission (under cyber warfare 
conditions) and to provide priority calls. Therefore, the Department of Defense 
ordered to develop one new secure AS-SIP protocol [10]. The AS-SIP protocol 
turned out to be extremely difficult. AS-SIP uses the services of almost 200 differ-
ent RFC standards while ordinary SIP uses only 11 RFC standards.
Figure 4. 
Joint vision 2020: Each warfare object has own IP address.
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The aim of “Joint Vision 2020” concept is to implement unified services based 
on Unified Capabilities concept. Army Unified Capabilities (UC) have defined as 
the integration of voice, video, and/or data services. These services have delivered 
across secure and highly available network infrastructure [11].
The following are the basic Voice Features and Capabilities:
• Call Forwarding (selective, on busy line, etc.)
• Multi-Level Precedence and Preemption (MLPP)
• Precedence Call Waiting (Busy with higher precedence call, busy with  
Equal precedence call, etc.)
• Call Transfer (at different precedence levels)
• Call Hold and Three-Way Calling and many others.
The Unified Capabilities services are covering a plenty of communication 
capabilities: from point-to-point to multipoint, voice-only to rich-media, multiple 
devices to a single device, wired to wireless, non-real time to real time, etc. A 
collection of services include email and calendaring, instant messaging and chat, 
unified messaging, video conferencing, voice conferencing, web conferencing 
(Figure 6).
Figure 5. 
Reference model for multifunction SoftSwitch [9].
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4. The target DISN infrastructure
The target DISN infrastructure contains two level switching nodes: Tier0 and 
Tier1 (Figure 7). Top level Tier0 nodes interconnect as geographic cluster and a 
cluster typically contains at least three Tier0 SoftSwitches. The distance between the 
clustered SoftSwitches must planned so that the return transmission time does not 
exceed 40 ms. As propagation delay equals 6 μs/km thus the distance between Tier0 
should not exceed 6600 km. The classified signaling environment uses a mix of pro-
tocols including the vendor-based H.323 and the AS-SIP signaling. The use of H.323 
has allowed only during the transition period to all IP protocol based DISN CVVoIP 
(Classified VoIP and Video). Classified VVoIP interfaces to the TDM Defense RED 
Switch Network (DRSN) via a proprietary ISDN PRI as a temporary exception.
In October 2010, the US Army Cyber Command had set up. USCYBERCOM is now 
a part of the Strategic Command along with strategic nuclear forces, missile defense 
and space forces [13]. One of Cyber Command key tasks is to build Joint Information 
Environment (JIE) and to implement Single Security Architecture (SSA).
It is worth noting the US Cyber Command activities significantly slow down the 
transition to IP world. Cyber Command shall receive UC network situational aware-
ness from all network agents including DoD Network Operations Security Centers 
(NOSCs), and the DISA Network Operation Center (NOC) infrastructure (Figure 8). 
Thus, DISA and the other DoD Components shall be responsible for end-to-end UC 
network management providing the strong cybersecurity requirements. The solution 
of cyber defense tasks radically changes the all DISN network modernization plans.
Figure 6. 
Rich information services surrounding a soldier: not too much?
7
On Telecommunications Thorn Path to the IP World: From Cybersecurity to Artificial Intelligence
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94575
Figure 7. 
DISN classified VoIP and video signaling design [12].
Figure 8. 
Operational construct for unified capabilities network operations [12].
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5. Joint regional security stacks
The essence of the Joint Information Environment concept is to create a com-
mon military infrastructure, provide corporate services and a unified security 
architecture. The very concept of JIE is extremely complex, and the requirements of 
cybersecurity make it even more difficult. According to SSA, Joint regional security 
stacks (JRSS) are the main components of the JIE environment providing a unified 
approach to the structure of cybersecurity as well as protecting computers and 
information networks everywhere in military organizations.
JRSS performs many functions as a typical IP-router providing cybersecurity: 
firewall functions, intrusion detection and prevention, and a lot other network 
security capabilities. JRSS equipment contains a complex set of cyber-protection 
software. For example, the typical NIPR JRSS stack is comprised physically of as 
many as 20 racks containing cyber-protection software and in real time testing 
information streams. Currently, JRSS stacks have installed for the NIPRNet (Non-
classified Internet Protocol Router Network). It has planned also to install the stacks 
for the SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network). In 2014, 11 JRSS stacks 
had installed in the United States, 3 stacks in the Middle East and one in Germany. 
The total amount of works includes the installation of 23 JRSS stacks on the NIPRNet 
service network and 25 JRSS stacks on the secret SIPRNet network (Figure 9). By 
2019, it has planned to transfer to these stacks all cybersecurity programs. In nowa-
days, these programs are located in more than 400 places over the world [13].
The DISN and DoD Component enclaves provide the two main network trans-
port elements of the DODIN (Department of Defense Information Network) with 
the interconnecting JRSS role as shown in Figure 10.
5.1 Shortcoming with the GSM-O project
On June 2012, Lockheed Martin won the largest tender for managing the DISN 
network - Global Services Management-Operations (GSM-O) project. The essence 
of the GSM-O contract was to modernize DISN management system taking into 
account the USCYBERCOM security requirements. The cost of work was 4.6 billion 
dollars for 7 years.
In 2013, the GSM-O team began to study the current state of the DISN 
management. There are four management centers: two centers in the US - at 
the AB Scott (Illinois) and Hickam (Hawaii) and two more - in Bahrain and 
Germany. They are responsible for the maintenance and uninterrupted operation 
of all Pentagon computer networks. The work is very laborious: there are 8100 
computer systems in more than 460 locations in the world, which in turn have 
Figure 9. 
JRSS current and planned deployments [14].
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connected by 46,000 cables. The first deal was to consolidate the operating cen-
ters - from four to two, namely, to expand the US centers by closing the centers in 
Bahrain and Germany.
In 2015, the telecommunications world had shocked by the news: Lockheed 
Martin is not coping with GSM-O project, not able to upgrade of the DISN 
network management. Lockheed Martin has sold its division “LM Information 
and Global Solutions” to the competing firm Leidos. One can assume that the 
failure of the work was most likely due to the inability to recruit developers. New 
generation of software makers are not familiar with the ‘old’ circuit switching 
equipment and are not capable to combine it with the latest packet switch-
ing systems. The more, they should take into account the never cybersecurity 
requirements [16].
5.2 The crucial JRSS failure
This failure is much more scandalous. During several last years, the GAO 
criticized Pentagon’s budget, particularly paying attention to JRSS budget. Many 
tests regarding JRSS effectiveness were unsuccessful, they were not able to reduce 
the number of cyber threats [17].
Despite the strong GAO critics, DoD continues the JRSS initiative. DOD stood 
up 14 of the 25 security stacks planned across the network in the U.S., Europe, 
and Pacific and southwest regions in Asia. The final security stack has planned for 
completing by the end of 2019 [18].
Could be fulfilled this Pentagon’s grandiose JRSS plan? The complexity of the 
task, in particular, characterizes the set of requirements for potential JRSS develop-
ers, named in the invitations to work for Leidos. The requirement list includes work 
experience of 12–14 years and knowledge of at least two or more products from 
ArcSight, TippingPoint, Sourcefire, Argus, Bro, Fidelis XPS, and other companies. 
In reality, it is extremely hard work to combine all these software complexes for 
cyber defense. The more, these high-level software developers should work in top-
secret environment.
It turned out that the project has a significant critical flaw: JRSS equipment 
is too S-L-O-W, the time for information stream processing is too long. It sounds 
like a sentence on the fate of the JRSS project [19]. Despite of that, the JRSS is 
going on.
Figure 10. 
The leading role of JRSS in DODIN transport [15].
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5.3 Could Leidos cope with GSM-O II?
On October 2018, the Defense Information Systems Agency has released a final 
solicitation for the potential 10-year 6.52 billion dollars project Global Solutions 
Management-Operations (GSM-O II). The contract winner is Leidos. GSM-O II is a 
single award contract designed to provide a full global operations and sustainment 
solution to support DODIN/DISN [20].
The key GSM-O II attributes include the cybersecurity defense of the DISA 
enterprise infrastructure and Joint Regional Security Stacks aids in the support to 
enhance the mission (?).
Now we are looking for Leidos success (or failure). It is yet unclear and 10-year 
period, of course, is a rather long time. Could Leidos cope with GSM-O II?
6. On JEDI cloud strategy and artificial intelligence initiative
The Defense Department’s never initiative concerns the cloud strategy. The 
foundation of cloud initiative is the general-purpose Joint Enterprise Defense 
Infrastructure (JEDI) [21]. The strategy emphasizes a cloud hierarchy at DOD, with 
JEDI on top. Many fit-for-purpose military clouds, which include MilCloud 2.0 run 
by DISA, will be secondary to the JEDI general-purpose cloud.
On April 10, 2019, the Department of Defense confirms that Amazon and 
Microsoft are the cloud contract winners. The competitors Oracle and IBM are 
officially out of the race for a key 10 billion dollars defense cloud contract.
Could be the JEDI Cloud Strategy successful? A key technological difficulty for 
the JEDI project is interoperability of clouds (Figure 11). The Pentagon’s JEDI cloud 
strategy leaves a series of unanswered questions that could be reasons for disasters 
in the future [22].
For internal interoperability, the strategy lays out the correct goal, common 
data and application standards. There are the 500+ clouds already used within the 
Pentagon. They have own data formats. Now they need to migrate and interoperate 
onto the unique JEDI platform.
The next unanswered question regards the JEDI cloud’s external interoperability. 
It concerns a future conflict situation. Would America’s allies need to use the same 
cloud provider (e.g., Microsoft) and the same data-formatting practices as the 
DoD? The strategy does not discuss these long-term issues.
Figure 11. 
DoD pathfinder to hybrid cloud environments [21].
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The cloud strategy has started in 2015 by establishing the Defense Innovation 
Unit (DIU). This DoD organization has founded to help the US military make 
easier and faster use of innovative commercial technologies. The organization has 
headquartered in Silicon Valley (California) with offices in Boston, Austin, and 
some more. The next step – the establishing of Joint Artificial Intelligence Center as 
a focal point of the DoD Artificial Intelligence Strategy [23].
Taking into account the potential magnitude of Artificial Intelligence’s impact 
on the whole of society, and the urgency of this emerging technology interna-
tional race, President Trump signed the executive order “Maintaining American 
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” on February 11, 2019. That document has 
launched the American AI Initiative. This was immediately followed by the release 
of DoD’s first-ever AI strategy [24].
Artificial intelligence - this is really one great idea, if it happens be successful. 
Could it have more success than JRSS initiative?
7. Conclusion: do not touch what works
US Army Regulator fights for IP technology but, honesty speaking, unsuc-
cessfully. The Army regulator recognizes in 2017 [25] that there is ‘old’ equipment 
on the network: time-division multiplex equipment, integrated services digital 
networking, channel switching video telecommunication services. According to 
the document [25], all these services will use IP technology, at least, in the nearest 
future. As an example, name the instructive claim regarding DRSN:
4–2.d. Commands that have requirements to purchase or replace existing 
Multilevel Secure Voice (previously known as Defense Red Switched Network 
(DRSN)) switches will provide a detailed justification and impact statement to the 
CIO/G–6 review authority.
In conditions of cyberwar, no reason to be surprised that the Defense Red 
Switch Network (DRSN) will use 40 years old ISDN technology for long time yet, 
the more – in conditions of cyberwar. DRSN is a dedicated telephone network, 
which provides global secure communication services for the command and control 
structure of both the United States Armed Forces and the NATO Allies (Figure 12). 
The network has maintained by DISA and has secured for communications up to 
the level of Top Secret.
“Red Phone” (Secure Terminal Equipment, STE) uses ISDN line for connections 
to the network. “Red Phone” operates at a speed of 128 kbps. There is the slot at the 
Figure 12. 
Secure terminal equipment; note slot in front for crypto PC card (left). The DRSN architecture (right) [25].
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bottom right serving for a crypto-card and four buttons at the top - to select the 
priority of communications. The STE is the primary device for enabling security. It 
may be used for secure voice, data, video, or facsimile services.
As we have mentioned above citing the AT&T view [1], the DoD today still has 
analog, fixed, premises-based, time-division multiplexing and seems could remain 
for unpredictable period according to the well-known software developers slogan: 
“Don’t touch what works”. In conditions of cyberwar, the very transition to internet 
technologies in telecommunications seems doubtful. Thus, we conclude that the 




AIN advanced intelligent network
AS-SIP assured services session initiation protocol
CS capability set
DISA defense information systems agency
DISN defense information systems network
DoD department of defense
DODIN department of defense information network
DRSN defense red switched network
GAO Government Accounting Office
IP internet protocol
ISDN integrated services digital network
JEDI joint enterprise defense infrastructure
JIE joint information environment




MGC media gateway control
NIPRNet non-classified internet protocol router network
RFC request for comments
SIP session initiation protocol
SIPRNet secret internet protocol router network
SS7 signaling system protocol #7
SSA single security architecture
UC unified capabilities
TDM time division multiplexing
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